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Although criticized as illegitimate, literary elements are necessary features 
of legal argument. In a modern liberal state, law motivates compliance by 
justifying controversial prescriptions as products of an appropriate process 
for representing the will of society. Yet because law constructs the will of 
individual and collective actors in representing them, its representations are 
necessarily figurative rather than mimetic. In evaluating law’s 
representation of society, citizens of the liberal state are also shaping their 
own ends. Such self-expressive choices, subjective but non-instrumental, 
entail aesthetic judgment. Thus the literary elements of rhetorical figuration 
and aesthetic appeal are fundamental, rather than merely ornamental, to 
legal justification. 
In the modern liberal state, law is seen as legitimate in so far as it successfully 
represents popular and individual will. Liberal legal thought tends to equate law’s 
legitimacy with the objectivity and mimetic accuracy of this representation. Thus, 
law achieves legitimacy by fulfiling democratic will, satisfying preferences, or 
protecting rights. 
Critics of liberal legal thought often respond that law is illegitimate because (1) 
it does not achieve its claimed objectivity or because (2) its formality precludes it 
from fully and authentically representing the subjectivity of society’s members. 
In making these arguments, critics of liberal legal thought deploy the analogy of 
law to literature in antithetical ways. Thus, critiques of the first kind insist that 
law is too literary – that is, too figurative and imaginative to represent objectively. 
Critiques of the second kind, however, charge that law is not literary enough – 
that is, insufficiently sensitive and expressive to represent authentically. Both of 
these arguments treat the literary as an anomaly within law, although for different 
reasons. The first critique accepts the modern liberal state’s aspiration to represent 
society objectively, and berates it for falling short of this ideal. The second 
critique presumes the modern liberal state’s success in achieving objectivity, but 
rejects this standard of mimesis in favor of authenticity. Both accept the liberal 
premise that law should accurately reflect society in its deliberations and 
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decisions, without changing society. Each criticizes part of modern liberal legal 
thought’s program of objective representation, at the price of endorsing the 
remainder. 
Drawing on pragmatic epistemology, post-structuralist literary theory, and 
institutionalist critiques of rational choice theory, this chapter rejects liberal legal 
thought’s aspiration to mimetic accuracy. Moreover, it rejects both forms of 
criticism as expressions of the same flawed aspiration. It treats the charge that law 
is insufficiently objective as a form of skepticism, and treats the complaint that 
law effaces authentic subjectivity as a form of sentimentalism. Both critiques are 
unpragmatic, demanding of law what it cannot possibly – and should not aspire to 
– deliver. Rather than evaluating law as a mimetic representation of society, this 
chapter reinterprets law’s allocation of decisionmaking authority as a necessarily 
figurative and constructive representation of society’s will. It understands legal 
argument to make a rhetorical appeal to aesthetic judgment rather than an 
empirical claim to mimetic accuracy. And it treats the larger question of the legal 
system’s legitimacy as a similarly aesthetic question of expressive validity. Thus, 
rather than treating the literary as anomalous within law, this chapter treats the 
literary as inherent in the construction and operation of legal authority. 
Like much imaginative literature, law represents subjectivities and their desires. 
But, also like these types of literature, law’s relationship to what it represents is 
figurative and performative rather than straightforwardly mimetic. Law constructs 
subjectivities in the process of representing them. In this way it composes and 
portrays the characters on which it relies for its authority. On this view, legal 
systems should be judged as much on the basis of the desires and characters they 
cultivate as on the basis of their efficiency in gratifying those desires or their 
accuracy in representing those characters. Law’s portrayal of society is ‘‘true’’ 
only in so far as we choose to make it so by identifying ourselves with it. Thus 
legitimacy involves a performative element, depending on the commitment of 
those who choose to identify with the law. Law can never simply reflect our 
authentic selves. Instead, it enables us to express ourselves in certain ways, and 
thereby precludes us from expressing ourselves in other ways. The question of 
who we should become is neither simply a question of ethical duty nor an arbitrary 
matter of consumer choice. Democratic self-fashioning poses value questions, but 
these value questions call for aesthetic judgment. 
One of my aims in laying out this aesthetic account of legal authority is to 
clarify the conceptual architecture of my book written with Bob Weisberg, 
Literary Criticisms of Law (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). The book reviewed and 
critiqued the emergent law and literature scholarship of the late twentieth century. 
It incorporated our earlier article ‘‘Cultural Criticism of Law’’ (Binder & 
Weisberg, 1997), and drew on other work of ours, including Bob’s well-known 
article ‘‘The Law-Literature Enterprise’’ (Weisberg, 1988). Threaded through 
Literary Criticisms of Law was an argument that, (1) in the modern liberal state, 
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law represents society rhetorically rather than mimetically and (2) the authority of 
law and the validity of particular legal arguments depend upon aesthetic 
judgment. In reviewing law and literature scholarship in that volume, we had two 
aims. One was to collect and explicate works that revealed law’s rhetorical and 
aesthetic dimensions. The other was to expose and critique the skeptical or 
sentimental premises of much law and literature scholarship. This chapter 
explicates the critical perspective developed in Literary Criticisms of Law, but 
does not attempt to illustrate or apply that perspective. It does not address the state 
of law and literature scholarship because what I have to say on that subject, I have 
said. 
My account of the role of the literary in legal authority will proceed as follows. 
First, I will develop and explain a conception of literature as rhetorical (i.e. 
figurative) discourse presented for aesthetic judgment. Second, I will offer a 
conception of law as a relatively coercive, formal, and justificatory institution. In 
so doing, I will contrast two models of justification within such an institution: a 
modernist model that seeks foundations in physiological or psychological facts, 
and a pragmatist model that tests claims by their implications for practice and 
evaluates these implications aesthetically. Third, I will offer an account of legal 
argument as a rhetoric offering narratively structured figurative representations of 
subjectivity for aesthetic judgment and expressive identification. Finally, I will 
characterize the skeptical and sentimental critiques of law as expressions of legal 
modernism and urge that legal justification be accepted as a pragmatic discourse 
which necessarily employs the literary elements of rhetorical representation and 
aesthetic judgment. 
1. LITERARY DISCOURSE AND AESTHETIC 
JUDGMENT 
Let us define literature as any kind of discourse that presents figurative 
representations or ‘‘rhetoric’’ for aesthetic judgment. Using such a conception, 
we can identify and analyze literary elements in many kinds of cultural practices, 
including law. 
By figurative or rhetorical language, I mean language that is not purely 
propositional. Rhetoric refers obliquely, substituting one proposition or other 
verbal sign for another, rather than substituting a proposition for a state of affairs 
or a set of sense data. An important claim of post-structuralist literary theory is 
that all language is figurative. This claim rests on ideas drawn from structuralist 
linguistics and pragmatist philosophy of language. Structuralism treats language 
as an organization of the experienced world rather than a set of labels for 
prelinguistic objects or sensations. On the structuralist view signs are given their 
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meanings not by the sense-experience they organize, but instead by their relations 
to and differences from other signs within a system (de Saussure, 1959; Culler, 
1975). In this sense, every proposition is a trope, evoking all the other propositions 
it differs from. 
Pragmatist philosophy of language shares the premise that thought apprehends 
the world through language (Peirce, 1931–1935). It holds that scientific data, for 
example, must be identified and recorded in a language laden with theoretical 
assumptions (Quine, 1963; Rorty, 1979). In contrast to structuralism, however, 
pragmatism envisions language as an evolving practice rather than a stable 
structure. On this view, the meaning of any utterance is its use – the actions and 
utterances to which it responds, and which predictably follow it. Because verbal 
meaning is merely customary, subject to evolving patterns of use, the concepts 
that organize thought can have no stable essence. Utterances are moves in a 
‘‘language game’’ with no predetermined outcome (Wittgenstein, 1968). Such a 
game presupposes that interlocutors are bound together by activities and 
institutions; but as the practical context for speech changes and as players respond 
to utterances in surprising ways, the use and meaning of particular sentences 
change. Thus every utterance differs not only from other words that might be said 
on this occasion, but also from the same words that might have been said on 
previous occasions, but with a different meaning (Hurley, 1989). This temporal 
differentiation means that every time we speak we are reusing past utterances to 
stand for new propositions, with open-ended meanings. For post-structuralists this 
constant reuse of language in an always-different context is a substitution of one 
sign for another, so that all utterances are rhetorical figures that invite the hearer 
to interpret an indeterminate meaning (Binder & Weisberg, 2000; Derrida, 1976; 
Culler, 1983). The contingency of meaning on the responses of others makes 
every move in a language game a gamble, requiring what legal theorist Karl 
Llewllyn called ‘‘situation-sense,’’ a kind of interpretive judgment and gestural 
grace (Llewellyn, 1960, pp. 60–61). 
This view of language as inevitably instable and rhetorical has some fairly 
straightforward implications for law. Thus, it suggests we are unlikely to control 
official discretion, or to secure a stable, predictable environment for individual 
choice, merely by issuing detailed rules (Tushnet, 1988; Levinson, 1988; Lieber, 
1839). The qualities of regularity and predictability are not relations of 
correspondence between prescribed and achieved states of affairs, but instead are 
feelings that officials have used language and exercised choice in tolerably 
legitimate ways. Such a feeling is likely to depend on a relatively peaceable 
context without rapid changes in social status or social norms. In other words 
stable social practices make it possible to ‘‘follow rules,’’ rather than the other 
way around (Fish, 1989). More importantly, the feeling of regularity is not the 
product simply of observation or measurement, but of a necessarily subjective and 
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evaluative judgment on the part of some socially situated observer. This is an 
ultimately aesthetic judgment about the way that officials perform their roles. 
If all speech is rhetorical, any speech can function as literature – can have 
literary meaning – in so far as it is subjected to aesthetic judgment. By aesthetic 
judgment I mean a conception developed by Kant in the Critique of Judgment, 
considered the foundation of the modern field of aesthetics (Kant, 1986). Kant 
took the appreciation of art as the paradigm for aesthetic judgment, but did not 
limit the concept to such judgments. According to his conception, aesthetic 
evaluation requires a subjective, concrete, disinterested, judgment of intrinsic 
value. For Kant, a judgment was an evaluation subject to discursive contestation 
and justification. Kant certainly did not agree that there is no disputing taste: in 
principle, one should be able to offer persuasive reasons for an aesthetic judgment, 
supported by invoking an interlocutor’s experience of the sensuous qualities of 
the object being judged. Yet, neither could logic or empirical evidence ever prove 
an aesthetic evaluation, or finally settle an aesthetic dispute. Thus aesthetic 
judgments are subjective rather than objective: they are not determined by logic 
or by characteristics of the object judged. Ultimately, each individual must be the 
judge of his or her own aesthetic experience. 
An aesthetic judgment is concrete in the sense that it is a judgment of a 
particular object, unmediated by any concept, rule, or general criterion. Joseph 
Heller’s Something Happened is a fine novel, not because it exemplifies the 
praiseworthy quality of suspense, but because of the particular way it wrings 
suspense out of the prosaic details of middle-class family life, as revealed by a 
narrative speaker determined to keep his anxieties hidden from himself. Thus, the 
particular way that suspense is expressed in this novel is aesthetically valuable 
because of its contribution to the novel’s unique formal structure. For Kant, the 
concreteness of aesthetic evaluation distinguishes it from moral evaluation, which 
measures every action by the same general standard of fairness. 
An aesthetic judgment is disinterested in the sense that it is not – although it 
may accompany – the experience of pleasure. Thus, a tragedy can impress me as 
great while overwhelming me with sadness; by contrast, a formulaic potboiler 
might give me just what I want, without impressing me at all. In Something 
Happened, the reader’s eager curiosity is an integral formal element, but so is the 
reader’s dread and discomfort. Particular pleasures may be necessary means to 
achieve particular aesthetic effects, but the value of such an effect is not reducible 
to the pleasure producing it. Finally, according to Kant’s conception, an aesthetic 
judgment is a judgment of intrinsic rather than instrumental value. A work of art 
is not beautiful or great because it causes pleasure, or any other good consequence. 
It might teach moral virtues, or give insight into human psychology, but such 
beneficial consequences are distinct from its aesthetic value. 
Aesthetic judgment plays a role in artistic expression and in the appreciation 
and criticism of artistic works. Just as the creation of art cannot be reduced to a 
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formula, art criticism does not apply general standards of value given in advance 
of the act of aesthetic judgment. Instead, it informs experience of the object of 
aesthetic judgment, in such a way as to create a shared or reproducible experience. 
To the extent that the shared experience made available by a critical interpretation 
impresses its audience as intrinsically valuable, it becomes possible to derive 
criteria of value from that shared experience. Aesthetic criticism identifies values 
expressed by human creations and judges those values on the basis of the shared 
experience of those creations. Thus, aesthetic criticism is less concerned with 
applying evaluative standards than with identifying, developing, and assessing 
values. 
Aesthetic judgment can play a role in other kinds of evaluative decisionmaking 
as well. It is relevant whenever a decisionmaker has a measure of discretion, yet 
is not simply gratifying her own desires. Typically, this sort of evaluative decision 
will arise in collective action, which often requires interpreting norms or 
representing others’ interests. Thus, when acting for an organization with an 
indefinite purpose or multiple purposes, a decisionmaker has to construct the 
organization’s mission in order to serve it. Particularly if the organization depends 
on the voluntary cooperation of its agents, the decisionmaker must act in a way 
that will be accepted by others as a coherent interpretation of the organization’s 
past practices and of the participants’ community of interest. One who acts for 
another as a fiduciary rather than an agent often has discretion to interpret the 
beneficiary’s interests, but cannot simply replace those interests with her own. In 
these situations of interpretation and representation, choice involves judgment 
rather than preference, and that judgment is partly aesthetic (Simon, 1978; Luban, 
1988). 
Ronald Dworkin has noted a similarly constructive element inherent in 
applying customary norms such as courtesy that require adapting conventions to 
changing social circumstances. Dworkin views this kind of ‘‘constructive 
interpretation’’ of an existing social practice as an exercise of aesthetic judgment 
(Dworkin, 1986). Pierre Bourdieu has identified an analogous combination of 
discretion and constrained judgment in the related social practice of gift-
exchange. A well-chosen gift should express something about the giver and the 
receiver; it should differ from the receiver’s past gifts to the giver, and yet 
symbolically equal or requite them (Bourdieu, 1990). The expression of courtesy 
is an aesthetic effect, but that does not mean it is merely ornamental. Tact 
facilitates trust, enabling strangers or rivals to achieve the mutual benefits of 
otherwise ‘‘irrational’’ cooperation. A British diplomat assigned to the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in occupied Iraq learned that ‘‘a cup of coffee delivered in 
the right way could win more friends than a new high school, and no amount of 
money could wipe clean an insult.’’ The relationships with tribal leaders he built 
on this sort of courtesy enabled him ‘‘to secure the release of a British 
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businessman,yhanded back to him as a ‘present’ from the uncle of the kidnapper’’ 
(Skidelsky, 2006, p. 12). 
Aesthetic judgment is also required in making decisions about the cultivation 
of tastes, whether for one’s self or another. When parents choose educational 
environments for a child they are acting as fiduciaries. Hopefully they are acting 
in the ‘‘best’’ interests of the child rather than simply gratifying their own 
preferences by unreflectively reproducing themselves or compensating for their 
own disappointments. Nor would we expect them merely to gratify the current 
preferences of the child (to do nothing but watch TV for example), who is not yet 
competent to formulate her own purposes without assistance. The parents are 
acting in part to determine the preferences and interests of the child by developing 
her character (Margulies, 1996, p. 1475). The interests that are ‘‘best’’ for this 
particular child in the long run, in the judgment of those who love and care for 
her, are interests she does not yet have and perhaps never would develop if raised 
by different parents with different capabilities and interests. Exercising such 
judgment is a profoundly serious responsibility, but it is nevertheless at least in 
part, an aesthetic choice: subjective, disinterested, informed by judgments of 
intrinsic worth (‘‘best’’), but also highly contingent and concrete (what are this 
child and these parents capable of under these circumstances?). 
Similarly, when a young adult makes important decisions with long-term 
consequences for herself – going to Antioch, entering the military or holy orders, 
emigrating, getting married, having a child – she is not gratifying her future 
preferences because those future preferences depend, in large part, on her choices. 
These kinds of identity-altering choices are better seen as selfexpressive or self-
fashioning than as self-gratifying. Such choices about what kind of person one 
would like to become are aesthetic choices in so far as they reflect judgment of 
what available or achievable roles, interests, and desires are most worthy, or will 
best realize one’s particular potential. The problem of character development that 
preoccupies modern fiction, drama, and lyric poetry is the problem that confronts 
us individually and collectively in a liberal society where we are free to define 
and develop our own virtues, free to – in Nietzsche’s telling phrase – ‘‘give style’’ 
to our characters (Nietzsche, 1974, pp. 185–186; Nehamas, 1985). Imaginative 
literature engages our aesthetic judgment in this problem, and trains it; but 
planning the development of character is a problem we face in ‘‘real’’ life. 
Following Kant, many thinkers have explored the role of these kinds of 
aesthetic judgments in politics and law. The poet Friedrich Schiller argued in his 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man that aesthetic experience was essential 
preparation for exercising the moral and civic obligations associated with freedom 
in the new democratic state. Deliberating about and cooperating to achieve the 
public good required training in empathetic imagination and disinterested 
evaluation. What would it feel like to be somebody else? What would society be 
like to live in after this or that legislative change? For Schiller, aesthetic 
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appreciation was also a kind of motivation necessary for compliance with moral 
and civic obligation. The creation of a good society, like the creation of art, could 
become a gratifying calling (Schiller, 1967). Hannah Arendt, in her lectures on 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, agreed that political persuasion among equals 
necessarily involves an aesthetic appeal. Democratic politics, for Arendt, is 
deliberative and transformative: if participants are unwilling to examine and alter 
their own preferences and identify with collective projects they are merely 
engaged in bargaining, not politics. Thus a legitimate law does not represent the 
electorate by reflecting the preferences of a majority of individuals. Instead it 
constitutes a figurative representation of a collective will that can only come into 
existence in the deliberative process and through collective action (Arendt, 1992). 
Juergen Habermas’s neo-Kantian ethical theory treats a deliberative discourse 
of instrumental and aesthetic evaluation as an indispensable legitimating 
condition for any legal or political arrangement. Drawing also on pragmatic 
epistemology, Habermas associates modern rationality with an open-ended 
process of testing belief, responsive not only to new evidence, but also to new 
conditions and purposes. For Habermas, deliberation unrestricted by a given end, 
concept, or object is the condition for justifying propositions in a self-governing 
society of equals. Habermas sees propositions of any kind as part of an 
institutional practice of language rather than as copies of sensory experience. 
Hence their validity is always provisional, dependent on ongoing social practices 
of evaluation and reason-giving rather than correspondence with objects or 
concepts. These provisional judgments of legitimacy are partly instrumental 
because they permit the invocation of those social purposes and practices on 
which interlocutors can agree. But in so far as those purposes and practices are 
themselves subject to challenge, interpretation, and revision, judgments of 
legitimacy are also aesthetic in part. Habermas’s major work on legal theory, 
Between Facts and Norms, emphasizes the interpretive character of deliberation 
about law. Legal institutions and rules always have an arbitrary, historically 
contingent character, or ‘‘facticity.’’ We tend to accept historically received laws 
provisionally because by establishing a modicum of social order and peace they 
facilitate collective action, including the justificatory deliberation that is the 
condition of legitimacy. The price of this provisional acceptance is the 
hermeneutic character of legal deliberation, the necessarily imaginative project of 
making normative sense of historical contingency (Habermas, 1996). 
Habermas’s reflections on law’s historicity or ‘‘facticity’’ respond to two 
leading post-war hermeneutic theorists of law, Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Dworkin. Both argued that legal interpretation was a creative process implicating 
aesthetic judgment. Gadamer, in Truth and Method, portrayed interpretation of all 
kinds as a dialogue between text and interpreter in which the interpreter comes to 
understand herself as a participant in an enabling language and culture rather than 
a self-determining instrumental actor (Gadamer, 1975). The legal interpreter 
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comes to understand the historically contingent legal text as not arbitrary for her, 
by developing a self-interpretation as a participant in an institutional tradition that 
generated the text and that enables judgments of meaning and value. Even the 
interpreter’s capacity to criticize existing legal arrangements draws upon a 
language, society, and history that also gave rise to those arrangements. To protest 
is to presume that the legal system is at some level bound by the values the 
protester invokes, so that the legal discourse always contains the germ of its own 
creative transformation. But that transformation depends on acts of creative self-
fashioning by interpreters implicated in that discourse. Dworkin, in Law’s Empire, 
offers a similar account of legal reasoning and argument as engaged participation 
in a legal system, in which a ‘‘constructive interpreter’’ makes sense of received 
legal materials by imagining the underlying purposes and principles of justice that 
make the ‘‘best’’ of them. Dworkin calls the hermeneutic obligation to make the 
best of law ‘‘the aesthetic hypothesis.’’ And he likens the interpretive process to 
reading a legal system’s past as the actions of a fictional person and continuing 
the story in a way that maintains that character’s ‘‘integrity’’ in both the aesthetic 
and the moral senses of that term (Dworkin, 1986). 
These thinkers see aesthetic judgment as part of law and politics because they 
see law and politics as settings for collective self-fashioning. They see political 
and legal legitimacy as an aesthetic effect, a value judgment that persuades 
individuals to identify themselves with a particular, historically contingent set of 
social arrangements and to embrace purposes that are not their own. In developing 
a conception of law as an object of literary analysis, then, we want to emphasize 
the role of figurative representations in legitimating law by persuading law’s 
subjects to identify with it, or at least to identify themselves in the terms law 
provides. 
2. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
In recent decades, social scientists in various fields have developed the concept 
of institutions to capture the causal role of a variety of factors left out of rational 
choice models of society. These include cultural meanings and values, but also 
routines and procedures for gathering and processing information, and for 
allocating decisionmaking authority. The juxtaposition of such seemingly 
disparate phenomena in the same category suggests surprising connections among 
them. Thus, for example, we can think of decisionmaking procedures as semiotic 
relations, in which person A is authorized to decide or act on behalf of person B 
or organization C; or in which facts D and E are taken as conclusive evidence of 
quality F. Similarly, we can conceive of virtues and value commitments as the 
performance of roles, such as the good Catholic, the neutral judge, or the obedient 
soldier. On this view, persons acting out value commitments serve as symbols, 
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standing for something beyond their own preferences. Because institutionalism 
presents both substantive and procedural norms as semiotic relations involving a 
kind of representation, it offers a perspective that may illuminate law’s literary 
aspect. 
Drawing on the institutionalist literature, we may define institutions as social 
practices organizing collective action through a discourse that classifies situations 
as subject to rules or other normative standards. Thus defined, institutions have a 
normative dimension, involving rule-following; a semiotic dimension, concerned 
with representing situations as instances of a class; and a social dimension, 
involving organization for collective action. Institutions sometimes also have a 
political dimension, concerned with the distribution of authority to make and 
apply normative judgments, and the distribution of responsibility to follow norms. 
Thus, institutions frequently classify persons as well as situations and apply so 
condition the application of normative standards on particular roles or statuses 
(MacCormick & Weinberger, 1986; March & Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Peters, 
1999; Ruiter, 1993; Scott, 1995; Searle, 1995). Institutions include almost any 
socially organized activity, such as science or art. Language, which organizes 
collective action through conventional representations that are subject to 
normative standards of referential and grammatical correctness, is an institution 
on which most other institutions depend. Money, a system of rules for 
representing exchange value, that facilitates exchange and resource allocation, is 
also an institution. 
Given a conception of an institution as a practice of using norms to organize 
collective action, we can define law as including any institution that is relatively 
coercive, formal, and articulate. So legal institutions involve norms of conduct 
understood, in principle, to be binding on persons recognized as occupying certain 
statuses, whether or not those individuals accept those obligations. These conduct 
norms are backed by sanctions, imposed by some persons at the request of others, 
according to norms of participation, investigative procedure, decision, and 
discursive justification. 
Finally, the process of generating all these norms is governed by additional norms 
of participation, procedure, and discursive justification (Komesar, 1997; Hart, 
1994). The formality of law consists in the prevalence of norms of participation 
and procedure in the discourse of legal justification. Most legal questions are 
resolved by identifying the authoritative decisionmaker, the past decisions of such 
an actor, or the standards authorized by such an actor, rather than by directly 
invoking values or goals. 
To characterize law as an institution is to say that it conditions participation on 
the acceptance of norms and the performance of roles. Institutional roles channel 
action by supplying actors with a set of motives, concerns, and assumptions and 
a limited repertoire of behaviors. Roles render action intelligible and predictable 
to others (Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu, 1977; Binder & Weisberg, 1997). The 
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desires to communicate to others or to be associated with certain roles can 
therefore motivate compliance with norms. In other words, people can comply 
with norms out of expressive rather than instrumental motives. 
As an institutional practice, then, law commands not only or ultimately by 
threatening. Law orders society through the combined effects of coercive force 
and normative authority. Norms without force are not laws, but commands are not 
laws unless they are obeyed also out of a sense of obligation. Moreover, law’s 
force and its authority are integrally connected. On the one hand, law can muster 
manpower and weapons only because many people agree that its commands 
should be obeyed. On the other hand, the availability of coercive force enhances 
law’s authority. Because many will prefer any effective legal system, however 
unjust, to anarchy or violent civil conflict, force tends to generate its own 
legitimacy. To view law as an institution, however, is to emphasize the role of 
law’s normative authority in inducing compliance and legitimizing state force. 
That authority is a cultural construct, real in so far as people believe it to be so. 
The authority of many institutions is a matter of unreflective habit. We usually 
accept money as valuable and language as meaningful without reflecting about 
how and why this is so. But law is different, at least in modern liberal states. Law 
is an arena of contestation and legal authority depends upon a self-conscious 
discourse of justification. In making legal arguments, participants of course try to 
establish the validity of particular propositions of law. Yet in so doing they also 
endorse the authority of law generally, warranting the rationality of the forum in 
which they appear, the validity of the statutes, prior cases and principles they cite, 
and the legitimacy of the process that generated these sources of law. 
A practical incentive to justify arises only when we need to – and can hope to 
– influence the behavior of others with some power to withhold cooperation. We 
justify actions and beliefs where contestation is possible but there are nevertheless 
common norms to appeal to. Thus, a discourse of justification is most likely in 
institutional settings characterized by a relative equality among participants, and 
a measure of freedom of action. Indeed, we may say that a distinctive 
characteristic of modern liberal societies is the proliferation of justificatory 
practices that presuppose this kind of freedom and equality. Justificatory 
discourse in such a society usually involves more than invocation of hierarchical 
status or tradition (Ackerman, 1980). Law, with its self-conscious discourse of 
justification, becomes a paradigm for other modes of institutional authority in 
such a society. 
Let us define modernity as a discursive situation premised on the 
epistemological principle that all knowledge must derive from human experience 
or reason, rather than tradition or faith; and the meta-ethical principle that all value 
must derive from human will or reason, rather than tradition or faith (Patterson, 
1996; Lyotard, 1984). Modernity gives rise to the practice of modernist criticism, 
which tests beliefs by reducing them to their foundations in sensation, will, and 
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reason. In the field of law, such reductionist movements as utilitarianism, legal 
positivism, legal science, legal realism, critical legal studies, and law and 
economics have exemplified modernist criticism (Bentham, 1996; Austin, 1873; 
Williston, 1920; Cohen, 1935; Singer, 1984; Posner, 1973). 
Modernity shapes justificatory discourses as responses to modernist criticism. 
In the face of normative disagreement, modernist justificatory discourse has a 
tendency to discount reason and to root values entirely in some form of will or 
desire. Justificatory reference to desire may be teleological (interests, utility, 
welfare, needs), or archaeological (consent, preferences, injuries). Reason (or 
‘‘rationality’’) may then be accorded a subordinate role in directing action to serve 
desire, or in reconciling conflicting desires through deliberation or aggregation. 
These variants of modernist justificatory discourse share a common assumption: 
that practices can only be justified by correspondence to observed fact. This 
insistence on a foundation in fact arises from modernism’s mistrust of the 
discourses of representation on which institutional practices depend. Modernist 
criticism treats the need for representation as an embarrassment. Thus, it strives 
to reduce these representations, or signs, to the ‘‘reality’’ they represent – ideas, 
sense impressions, desires, intentions, verbal meanings, material interests, 
behavior, and so forth. From this perspective, representations have meaning or 
value by virtue of their correspondence to some state of affairs. In short modernist 
criticism presumes that representation has a mimetic function (Patterson, 1996; 
Ankersmit, 1996). 
In epistemology, modernist criticism asks ‘‘what is it about the world that our 
statements must conform to, to make them true?’’ In philosophy of language, it 
asks ‘‘what must a claim about the meaning of language correspond to, to make 
it true?’’ Philosophers’ answers to these questions have generally taken the form 
of an intelligible essence, or some similar mental entity. Thus, rationalists held 
that knowledge was founded on clear and distinct ideas. Empiricists complained 
that these ideas were unobservable specters, and replaced them with sense 
impressions and mental associations. As pragmatists pointed out, however, 
empiricists thereby reproduced the idealism for which they had criticized the 
rationalists. Empiricists assumed we could only understand, use, and 
communicate about our environment if it came equipped with mental handles for 
words to grasp onto (Rorty, 1979). As argued in the preceding section, however, 
this idea of a direct linkage between words and features of the world 
mischaracterizes how we use language. Linguistic and literary structuralists have 
pointed out that signifieds, what words denote or connote, are linguistic 
constructs, no less dependent on a system of conventional signs than are their 
verbal signifiers (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). Pragmatic philosophers of language 
and literary post-structuralists have converged on the view that these signifieds 
are shifting webs of association rather than hard-edged concepts or categories. 
The meaning of any term is hostage to the evolving history of its use. Because no 
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two occasions of use are identical, every use of language is rhetorically figurative, 
and every act of communication or interpretation is a speculative move in a 
language game (Wittgenstein, 1968; Hurley, 1989; Derrida, 1976; Binder & 
Weisberg, 2000). Every classificatory judgment is a normative claim within an 
institutional practice that may be accepted, rejected, or reinterpreted by others. 
Pragmatism takes the failure of philosophy’s varied attempts to translate 
language and thought into unmediated reality, as evidence that the task should be 
abandoned. Pragmatism therefore rejects the assumption that representation must 
stand in a relation of correspondence with the world, in order to be meaningful 
(Rorty, 1979). Instead, pragmatism views representations simply as tools for 
organizing social practices, and holds that their necessarily unstable meaning 
inheres in their use. Since the same utterances can be used by both speakers and 
hearers, by multiple authors and later by different readers, there is never any single 
spatial and temporal locus of meaning, no ultimate authority on what any 
utterance means. Representation, in the sense used here – the use of signs within 
an institutional practice – is never purely mimetic. It is always figurative and 
always offered for normative judgment. 
The disagreement between modernism and pragmatism about representation 
extends to the special case of political representation. Political representation is a 
form of collective action involving (1) a division of labor that allocates power to 
persons acting in designated roles to promulgate or apply norms backed by 
coercive sanctions and (2) a justificatory discourse ascribing these exercises of 
power to others. Persons may be represented by particular other persons, or by 
organizations, within which different persons may have different roles 
(Ankersmit,1996; Pitkin, 1967). Political representation is a common institutional 
structure in modern legal systems, and the justificatory discourse of political 
representation is an important source of legal argument. 
Just as modernist epistemology and philosophy of language have looked for a 
third term to explain how representations can correspond to what they represent, 
modernist political theory has done the same. Political theory asks what about us 
political institutions must represent to make their representation legitimate. The 
answers – preferences, interests, opinions, convictions – purport to be 
psychological facts about persons. But like any other signified, these objects of 
representation depend upon the system of signs that differentiates them from other 
signifieds (Ankersmit, 1996; Hurley, 1989). Thus, we need an agenda, a menu of 
options, in order to have an opinion. We need issues, establishing political axes, 
before we can locate our political positions on those axes (Pildes & Anderson, 
1990; Mackie, 2003). In this sense, the political preferences electoral and 
legislative institutions represent are ‘‘endogenous’’ to those institutions (Hurley, 
1989; March & Olsen, 1995; Green & Shapiro, 1994). Political representations, 
therefore, cannot correspond to social fact. They cannot achieve mimetic truth. 
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They must win normative acceptance from those they represent on some other 
basis. 
Based on its view of representation as inherently rhetorical, pragmatism also 
offers an account of both cognitive and evaluative justification that rejects the 
mimetic premise of modernism. Pragmatic justification makes the test of any 
action or belief the difference it makes in practice. It asks us to compare the 
consequences of any action or claim with the consequences of available 
alternative actions or claims. But unlike other consequentialist doctrines, such as 
utilitarian policy analysis or verificationist epistemology, pragmatism does not 
prescribe further criteria for comparing alternative bundles of consequences. It 
treats the justification of action and belief as a matter of situated practical 
judgment, and denies that justification must rest on a foundation of indubitable 
knowledge (Rorty, 1979; Patterson, 1996; Herzog, 1985; Binder, 2001). 
Aesthetic judgment has a special role to play in the consequentialist evaluation 
required in pragmatist justification. Pragmatism asks us to evaluate consequences 
without the metric provided by some foundational standard of value. It is tempting 
to assume that this means we should simply assess consequences instrumentally, 
by reference to the purposes we already have. But this evades such questions as 
what feasible choices we have among purposes, what the consequences would be 
of choosing different purposes, whether those consequences would be better or 
worse, and from what perspective. We cannot employ instrumental reason to 
evaluate ends: this is a question of aesthetic judgment (Binder, 2001). Thus, in so 
far as legal justification is pragmatist rather than modernist, it will involve a 
rhetorical appeal to aesthetic judgment. 
3. THE RHETORIC OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 
Legal justification is a rhetoric that makes an aesthetic appeal. It combines three 
types of rhetorical figures. The most important of these is the political 
representation of subjective will. In a modern liberal state, law is seen as a human 
creation, designed to serve human needs (Cardozo, 1921). Accordingly, law’s 
content is justified by reference to the utility or choice of human beings or their 
institutional representations. Legal argument and decision therefore involve 
prospective reasoning about the interests of persons, groups, populations, 
institutions, and polities; and retrospective reasoning about the content and 
competence of their choices. In other words, almost all legal argument is about 
the desires of legal actors, how best to measure, identify, or represent those 
desires, and whose desires should count (Binder & Weisberg, 1997; Binder, 
2001). 
These political representations of subjective will are framed by three forms of 
narratives: narratives of reconciliation, narratives of authorization, and narratives 
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of legitimation. Narratives of reconciliation are the rhetorical structures used to 
explain how the will of each becomes the will of all. Thus, they explain how the 
invisible hand of the market reconciles the competing desires of consumers into 
efficient allocations of resources; or how political processes organize the 
incommensurable preferences of voters into a coherent popular will; or how wise 
judges rationally reconcile the competing liberty claims of litigants. In other 
words, narratives of reconciliation warrant particular decisionmaking procedures 
as methods for representing society as a whole. Narratives of authorization link a 
particular act to the will of all, in the form of a past authoritative decision or a 
future societal goal. Finally, narratives of legitimation warrant the subjective will 
of society itself as an authoritative source of law by linking it to some greater 
source of virtue in the past or future. 
‘‘Narrative’’ refers to the recounting of a story, a chronological sequence of 
causally linked events in the experience of a human or anthropomorphized 
subject. A narrative is a kind of rhetorical trope, a structure of meaning imposed 
on events by their selection, ordering, and telling. It begins in equilibrium, 
presenting a stable routine of behaviors and roles. This equilibrium is then 
disturbed by some conflict, often between the subject and forces external to it, 
which disrupts routines and roles, opening new possibilities. The story ends in a 
new state of equilibrium (Binder & Weisberg, 2000; Winter, 1989; Scholes & 
Kellogg, 1966; Todorov, 1971). The mediation of such a story by a teller rather 
than performers distinguishes narrative from drama, but both are mediations 
distinct from events themselves (Scholes & Kellogg, 1966). In modern culture, 
the activity of a narrator alerts an audience to the artifactual or subjectively 
constructed quality of the story, even when the resulting narrative is nonfictional 
(Binder & Weisberg, 2000). 
Narrative, like drama, makes a sensuous appeal to an audience’s judgment by 
creating the aesthetic quality of suspense. It evokes tension by describing 
disequilibrium, and suspends that tension by recounting events in a temporal 
order. The narrator promises to resolve that tension if only the reader will patiently 
continue a little longer. Thus the act of reading narrative commits the reader to a 
kind of contract, which invests the reader in accepting the resolution, when it 
comes, as appropriate and satisfying (Sussman, 1998; Brooks, 1996). Despite 
narrative’s predictable form, it must be unpredictable in the details to achieve the 
necessary aesthetic qualities of suspense and surprised relief. In this sense it 
invites the reader to engage in the particularistic judgment characteristic of 
aesthetic experience generally. 
Narrative has always been involved in the legitimation of normative orders 
(Cover, 1983; Lyotard, 1984; MacIntyre, 1985). This is obvious in preliterate 
societies, which can only record and transmit their norms and political institutions 
in the form of memorable stories. But literacy begins with the transcription of 
these national or tribal epics. In modern society, such epics have been replaced 
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with more specialized discourses: narrative histories to record the origins and 
development of political institutions, narrative novels and memoirs to recount the 
interaction of character and role, and non-narrative law codes to fix norms and 
procedures. Yet these functionally distinct and formally disparate genres 
presuppose one another. Modern law tends to be seen as entrenching two large 
institutional structures: a more or less democratic nation state and a civil society 
of transacting individuals. The national history underwrites the first, by grounding 
an argument that law has organized a population into a political community 
capable of conferring its consent to governance (White, 1981; Bhaba, 1990). The 
novel and memoir underwrite the second, by warranting that the individual is 
capable of rationally and responsibly exercising the discretion inherent in legal 
personality (Gagnier, 1987; Gallagher, 1994; Lukacs, 1920; Lynch, 1998). At the 
same time, law gives these genres their subjects, organizing the polities whose 
careers are recounted in history, and the civil societies within which novelistic 
characters pursue their careers of romance, intrigue, and social climbing. 
Authorization narratives play an essential role in law’s justificatory discourse. 
The very concept of sanction involves the structure of a story, triggered by some 
deviation from a prescribed state of affairs, followed by an act of judgment, and 
a corrective response (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). The official imposing a 
sanction justifies it as authorized by a prior act of legislation. The legislator 
defining the sanction justifies it as the path to a brighter future or the restoration 
of a disrupted past. Both official and legislator claim authority on the basis of 
prior acts of appointment or election. 
Legal argument generally involves one of two forms of authorization narrative, 
depending on where the speaker locates the current dispute along the narrative arc 
between equilibrium disrupted and equilibrium restored. Archaelogical argument 
locates the disruptive crisis in the past. Thus, applicable legal norms have emerged 
from the authoritative settlement of that conflict. The current dispute is an echo 
of that earlier conflict and has, in effect already been settled. To decide otherwise 
is to reopen that conflict and reproduce the problems the applicable legal norm 
earlier solved. Teleological argument locates the disruptive crisis in the present. 
Thus, the current dispute results from a defective normative order, in which the 
needs of some are unmet or the goals of all are unrealized. The applicable legal 
norm will achieve the needed change. Archaeological argument predominates in 
litigation and teleological argument predominates in legislation. But many legal 
arguments combine both archaeological and teleological elements. Thus, the 
current dispute is governed by an earlier normative settlement that promulgated a 
collective goal as yet unachieved. Both teleological and archaeological narratives 
derive authority from a collective will that must be constructed in the act of 
representation. 
Teleological representation involves prospective reasoning about the public 
interest or the social welfare. Such teleological representation involves imagining 
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and comparing the future histories of alternative hypothetical societies, each with 
not only different legal regimes, but also different populations with different 
values and interests. When different societies have different histories and 
institutional structures, they are likely to make available quite disparate social 
identities and roles to their members. These disparate identities and roles will 
encourage members of differently constituted societies to pursue different 
purposes and interests. 
When we try to compare societies with different members, values, and interests 
from the standpoint of social welfare we face imponderables. Should you prefer a 
wealthier society in which you had a different family or personality? Should you 
prefer a more peaceful society in which you did not exist? The choice among such 
incommensurable alternatives is not the simple matter of calculating which future 
will be better for people because the alternatives are populated by different people. 
Such a decision requires us to choose among the different personal, group, 
institutional, and societal identities that will shape the preferences of future 
generations. We cannot hold their future preferences fixed and choose policies 
that will best realize them. Instead, the design of the future society, its 
membership, and its values is a necessarily expressive or aesthetic choice for us 
(Parfit, 1984; Binder, 2001). 
We face further value choices in reasoning about the future welfare of society. 
We must choose distributive standards both within and across generations. We 
must choose a time horizon: the future is infinite, our knowledge of it finite and 
diminishing (Herzog, 1985). We must choose how to compare aggregate and 
average utility (Parfit, 1984). We must choose a geographic scope: Is each 
government responsible only for the welfare of the population in its territory? 
Even if its decisions may affect immigration and emigration? (Binder, 1993a). All 
these choices about how best to aggregate and compare subjectivity are 
themselves subjective. We cannot simply enact the preferences of future people, 
because we must decide which future people to consult, and what preferences they 
will have. These decisions inevitably depend on our value choices, not those of 
the future people whose welfare we would serve. Indeed, our value choices about 
future welfare are likely to be interpretive responses to the identities, roles, and 
traditions we have inherited from the past (Fish, 1989; Gadamer, 1975). We 
express ourselves in making these choices. We fashion a design for the future that 
is our best vision of how to continue a historical narrative in which we find 
ourselves (MacIntyre, 1985; Dworkin, 1986). 
The inevitable discretion we have to shape the future preferences we would 
satisfy prevents teleological representation from achieving mimesis. From the 
standpoint of modernist criticism, teleological representation therefore seems 
illegitimate. In the face of the subjective, expressive, and arguably aesthetic value 
choices entailed in prospective policy making, it is tempting to revert to some 
form of archaeological representation. 
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Archaeological representation consists in retrospective reasoning about indicia 
of societal consent. The difficulty is that notions like popular consent are 
incoherent and instable without authoritative institutional definition, and the 
institutions defining popular consent can ultimately find no warrant in popular 
consent. Institutional authority depends upon legitimating narratives, which make 
a persuasive appeal for a performative response (Lyotard, 1984). To judge the 
persuasiveness of these legitimating narratives, we must make expressive and 
aesthetic choices. Just as prospective reasoning about future welfare implicates 
aesthetic judgment, so does retrospective reasoning about past acts of consent. 
Thus, when legal decisionmakers represent society’s will, they again face a 
number of discretionary choices. First they must decide to what extent they are 
going to represent society as a single democratic decisionmaker, and to what 
extent they will represent society as a collection of individual transactors (Binder 
& Weisberg, 1997). In other words, we can think of the tension between 
majoritarian democracy and individual liberty, or between political allocation and 
market allocation, as an aesthetic dilemma, a problem of representation. Each of 
these forms of representation reconciles conflicting preferences in a different way, 
and by assigning different decisions to different institutions we can represent the 
same individuals quite differently. Within each of these modes of representation 
there are further dilemmas, reflecting the indeterminacy of the ideals of 
majoritarian democracy, individual liberty, and allocative efficiency. The 
indeterminacy of these three ideals in turn reflects the opacity of the 
corresponding institutions of elections, legal rights, and market exchange as 
media for representing consent. 
Majoritarian democracy is the conception of consent represented by the 
institution of elections. Yet as an ideal, majoritarian democracy is afflicted with 
the familiar problem of social choice. According to Arrow’s classic 
demonstration, no social choice mechanism can aggregate fixed individual 
preference orderings of more than two alternatives into a coherent social 
preference ordering. A coherent social preference ordering therefore requires that 
individual preferences vary with and depend on the institution aggregating them 
into a collective choice (Arrow, 1963). The practical point of Arrow’s voting 
paradox is not that indeterminacy is possible with three alternatives or more, but 
that indeterminacy is almost inevitable when the number of alternatives becomes 
very great. Democratic electorates must choose among an infinitely large set of 
alternative possible futures. If they do so through pairwise comparisons, the 
results are likely to depend on the order of comparison. If they try to compare all 
alternatives at once, different schemes for weighting preferences will yield 
different results (Mackie, 2003). In sum, the choice of voting procedures proves 
more important than voting in determining electoral choices. There is no simple 
fact of the matter about collective preferences for the institution of democracy to 
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represent. The figurative replacement of individual preferences by majority will 
is one type of reconciliation narrative. 
As a conception of consent, majoritarian democracy is also necessarily 
incomplete. It depends on some set of procedural conditions designed to guarantee 
free and equal participation – universal suffrage, secret ballots, freedom of speech 
and press, and so on. These procedural conditions set limits to the power of 
democratic majorities to legislate: they cannot disfranchise, exile, enslave or 
exterminate minorities, for example, without destroying the conditions for 
majoritarian democracy. Majoritarian democracy is therefore a self-limiting ideal, 
requiring a supplementary scheme of individual rights (Holmes, 1995). 
Individual liberty is the conception of consent represented by the institution of 
legal rights, supervised by the institution of courts. Liberty offers an alternative to 
majoritarian democracy as an organization of consent. If political processes 
cannot yield demonstrably legitimate choices, it is tempting to decrease the scope 
of political decisionmaking as much as possible, and increase the scope for 
individual decisionmaking. Thus the classical liberal thought popular among 
American and German lawyers of the mid- to late nineteenth century, attempted 
to restrict the domain of collective choice by recognizing individuals as 
autonomous within a sphere of purely self-regarding action. Individuals, it was 
said, were free to act as long as their actions imposed no harm on others. Classical 
liberals assumed that society was so designed that individuals had a wide scope 
within which they could act without effecting others, and reasoned that neither the 
state nor other individuals should interfere with such purely self-regarding action 
(Gordon, 1983; Singer, 1982). This vision of an atomistic society rested on a 
conception of property rights as relations between persons and things, and of the 
objects of property rights as environments – physical spaces paradigmatically – 
within which individuals could act without affecting one another (Binder, 2002). 
Yet such American legal realists as John Wesley Hohfeld and Walter Wheeler 
Cook argued persuasively that purely self-regarding action is a chimera. To use a 
resource is to interfere with rival potential uses, and to recognize a right of 
autonomy on the part of one person is to impose a duty of non-interference on the 
part of others. This analysis demonstrated that a property right was a social 
relation and that the object of property was always an arena of social interaction 
and conflict, rather than a peaceful private retreat (Cook, 1918; Cohen, 1927; 
Hohfeld, 1913; Coase, 1960; Singer, 1982). This meant in turn that the problem 
of collective choice cannot be solved simply by disaggregating it into a series of 
individual choices. Any such strategy depends on a social decision to distribute to 
individuals the right to exclude all others from access to certain resources. The 
ideal of individual liberty depends on the figurative replacement of conflicting 
desires with an authoritative allocation of rights. In short it depends upon the 
reconciliation of conflicting claims of justice, perhaps by a court. The need for 
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such an allocation of rights simply moves the problem of social choice back to an 
earlier stage. 
Like the ideal of majoritarian democracy, the ideal of individual liberty is self-
limiting. Some sort of politics must limit each person’s liberty, to insure the equal, 
or at least minimally adequate liberty of others. And just as the unrestricted 
exercise of majoritarian democracy today may destroy the conditions for its 
exercise tomorrow, the unrestricted exercise of individual liberty in the present 
may waste the requisites of individual liberty in the future. Individuals may sell 
or indebt themselves into slavery, addict themselves to dangerous products, or 
enthrall themselves to exploitative creeds. To institutionalize individual liberty, 
society must make a political choice about how much paternalistic protection it 
will provide individuals. 
Allocative efficiency is the conception of consent represented by the institution 
of market exchange. It offers a representation of desire that is collective, and yet 
not aggregative. In this way, it promises to resolve some questions of resource 
allocation in a way that responds to individual preferences, while avoiding the 
paradoxes of social choice theory. By hypothesis, when a resource is exchanged 
it is moved to a use that is more valuable socially, but without any social 
decisionmaker aggregating the utilities of the transacting parties. Assuming that a 
transaction is uncoerced, it should make both parties at least marginally better off. 
And assuming there are no transaction costs, anyone else whose welfare is 
decreased by the transaction can attempt to prevent it by bribing the parties forgo 
it (Coase, 1960). So if unrestricted opportunities for costless transactions are 
institutionalized, society should be able to constantly reallocate resources in ways 
that increase the welfare of some without decreasing the welfare of any. Assuming 
no transaction costs or coercion, market exchange should be able to allocate 
resources optimally, regardless of their initial distribution. By means of the 
reconciliation narrative of the invisible hand, individual desire is transformed into 
collective utility without the need for politics. But like majoritarian democracy 
and individual liberty, allocative efficiency is a necessarily incomplete 
representation of aggregate desire. 
First, efficiency depends on politics. While efficiency presumes the ideal of 
costless transactions, all transactions involve the cost of enforcing promises and 
defining and securing entitlements to the resources traded. These costly services 
are typically provided by government without a fee. So the transactional model of 
collective decisionmaking presupposes a political process of collective 
decisionmaking to establish the institutions of property and contract within which 
transactional decisions will take place (Barzel, 2002; North, 1990; Rose, 1989). 
Second, efficiency depends upon individual liberty. If choices are coerced, we 
cannot interpret them as welfare-maximizing revelations of preferences. And 
since all market choices are constrained by the available goods, and the limitations 
of the actor’s purchasing power, market choices are all coerced in varying degree 
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(Crawford, 1997). Determining whether to deem a particular menu of options 
excessively coercive requires a collective, political judgment. 
Third, any claim that uncoerced, costless transactions are allocatively efficient 
becomes circular, when combined with two premises of neo-classical economics: 
the behaviorist methodological assumptions that satisfaction cannot be reliably 
observed and that utility cannot be compared across persons (Robbins, 1938; 
Samuelson, 1938; Samuelson, 1950; Friedman, 1953). On these assumptions 
welfare must be defined behaviorally as the result of uncoerced, costless 
transactions; yet there is no way to determine if an actual or possible transaction 
meets these conditions without knowing its welfare effects. Economists recognize 
no independent measure of welfare by which they can determine whether coercion 
has caused, or transaction costs have prevented any particular transaction. 
Just as an election cannot register each voter’s preferences for all possible 
futures, a market cannot register each consumer’s preferences for all possible 
goods and services. Consumers can only spend wealth they have, and only on the 
particular goods and services producers provide. Like electoral institutions and 
property, markets construct an arena for the exercise of choice and thereby create 
a medium for expressing desires choosers might not otherwise have (Anderson, 
1993; Walzer, 1983). 
Finally, like the ideals of majoritarian democracy and individual liberty, the 
ideal of allocative efficiency is self-limiting. Like voting and the exercise of 
property rights, market exchange can destroy its own institutional conditions. If 
individuals can sell themselves, or trade away the requisites of participation in 
market exchange, their preferences will no longer influence market allocation. 
The unrestricted transacting required for efficient allocation is a procedural 
impossibility. Politics must create and define markets, as well as spheres of 
individual liberty. 
We have seen that each of the idioms for representing consent – majoritarian 
democracy, individual liberty, and allocative efficiency – is an opaque medium. 
Thus, each medium of archaeological representation constructs the consent that it 
represents. But when legal decisionmakers represent societal will they must not 
only choose within each idiom, they must also choose among them. In designing 
the institutions of electoral politics, individual rights, and market exchange, legal 
decisionmakers are not only influencing the particular goals and policies to which 
members of society consent, they are also shaping the forms of consent – 
democracy, liberty, or efficiency – made available to them. The design of a mix 
of institutions for registering consent is itself a social or political choice that 
cannot be justified by consent alone, without an infinite regress. 
But if neither future social welfare nor past consent can legitimate legal 
institutions what can? Such institutions can only be rendered authoritative by 
means of a legitimating narrative. Legitimation narratives present particular legal 
institutions as their audience’s proper path from virtuous origins to future well-
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being. They make a performative appeal, inviting an audience to identify itself 
with a particular institutional medium for representing desire. Such legitimating 
narratives are a necessary part of legal argument, because without them, legal 
argument cannot warrant particular archaeological and teleological 
representations of societal will as authoritative. A narrative of virtuous 
institutional origins is needed to cope with two related problems of liberal political 
theory, the problem of collective action and the problem of political obligation. 
The collective action problem arises among individuals who are rationally self-
interested, uncoerced, and well-informed. Such persons have no incentive to 
cooperate in producing or conserving public goods such as renewable resources, 
common defense, or security of entitlements. By defecting, they can receive the 
benefits of the public good without bearing the costs of its provision. Hence all 
will find it rational to defect, with the perverse result that none will enjoy the 
public good (Olson, 1965). And so, the argument concludes, government is 
needed to coerce free riders into cooperating to produce public goods. Convinced 
by the security of government enforcement that one’s fellow citizens will 
cooperate in the provision of public goods, each citizen will ungrudgingly 
cooperate in turn. 
But this willingness depends upon each citizen’s faith in the stability, 
effectiveness, and civic responsibility of the institutions charged with enforcing 
cooperation. And rational self-interest maximizers will be very skeptical of 
promises to establish a stable and effective rule of law. For such a government is 
itself a public good requiring cooperation to establish. So government arguably 
could never come into existence among people who were uncoerced, rationally 
self-interested, and well-informed, even if they desired it (Rose, 1989). 
The existence of an effective liberal government therefore presupposes a prior 
history involving coercion, altruism, or myth. Coercion can play at least two roles 
in establishing liberal government. A liberal government can arise as a result of 
the internal reform of an authoritarian state or as a result of a violent revolution, 
establishing military rule before building liberal institutions. Yet a revolutionary 
movement is also an irrationally cooperative enterprise that must be explained in 
terms of coercion, altruism or myth. By altruism, I mean a disposition to cooperate 
regardless of the defection of free riders. Altruism can play a role in establishing 
effective government when tribal, religious or ideological solidarity becomes a 
basis for civic loyalty. By myth I mean faith that others will cooperate in obeying 
and defending government when this has not been proven by experience. 
Typically, myth takes the form of an invented past characterized by heroic 
altruism, solidaristic cooperation, and virtuous government. A myth of national 
origin can support a solidaristic ideology (Binder & Weisberg, 2000; Anderson, 
1983; Gellner, 1983). Historically speaking, modern liberal states arise through a 
combination of these processes, rather than through uncoerced contracting among 
rationally self-interested individuals. Indeed, we are unlikely to see rationally self-
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interested individuals unencumbered by solidaristic commitments or authoritarian 
beliefs except in a liberal state. Rationality can only be the product of liberal 
institutions, not their source. 
In addition to solving the collective action problem, a mythic narrative of a 
heroic founding can solve a related problem, that of political obligation. This 
problem arises in consent theories of political legitimacy. If government derives 
its legitimacy only from the consent of the governed, it is not clear why its citizens 
should comply with laws they do not personally agree to. Nor is it clear why 
anyone born into such a society (rather than joining it voluntarily) should respect 
its laws. Revolutionary origins symbolize the moral basis of many modern states 
in the consent of the governed, yet they also illustrate the fragility of such a 
foundation. Every legal system must account for its origins in an act of 
transgression against a preexisting legal order (Cover, 1983). So a state’s 
revolutionary origin poses the problem of political obligation, unless it provides 
some additional basis of legitimacy beyond consent. That is why a myth of 
revolutionary heroism is particular important: a reputation for extraordinary virtue 
is needed to explain why the founding generation had a right to revolt, but their 
successors do not. 
The liberal state cannot induce cooperation and provide public goods unless it 
is stable. But it cannot promise stability if it holds that citizens are only bound to 
obey law as long as they consent to do so. The disenchanted liberal individual, 
loyal only to his own property, cannot by himself sustain the polity that protects 
it. Thus the authority of the liberal state can never be explained by reference to 
consent alone. To solve the problem of political obligation, the narrative 
mythology of the liberal state must offer a reason why the consent of the founders 
binds their successors. To distinguish the founding exercise of will from future 
defections, it must be remembered as virtuous, motivated by altruism rather than 
selfishness. The popular ‘‘consent’’ which legitimates new laws is not purely a 
matter of will: it is a matter of keeping faith with virtues that a patriotic mythology 
ascribes to a political founding. When we make law, we do not simply reveal 
preference: we exercise the authority of office. Our consent can only authorize 
law, if we have first characterized ourselves as authoritative, in an act of literary 
imagination (Vining, 1988; Derrida, 1986). 
Thus the claim that a legal system makes to legitimacy is not simply a claim 
about ethics, or about political fact. It is a performative appeal that offers each 
citizen recognition as a member of a particular political community. It must offer 
not only just and efficacious institutions, but an identity which each citizen will 
perceive as appealing to all, and so which may plausibly promise to bind each 
citizen to those institutions. It demands of each citizen a performative response, 
identifying with a political community and thereby recognizing other citizens as 
members. To thus identify herself with a political community and its other 
members, is to make an expressive choice (Ankersmit, 1996). And such an 
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expressive choice depends on at least two kinds of judgment that can fairly be 
characterized as aesthetic. First, in choosing an identity for herself and others she 
chooses purposes. Second, in choosing an identity to share with others, she must 
interpret a collective project. Such judgments are too subjective and historically 
contingent to count as moral, yet they are aimed at selfconstitution rather than 
merely self-gratification. 
4. CONCLUSION: THE AESTHETIC PREDICAMENT OF 
LEGAL CRITICISM 
In liberal states legal arguments depend on representations of human will, taking 
the form of judgments about future social welfare or past popular consent. Yet 
these representations are not simply mimetic, because social welfare and popular 
will are constituted in the very act of representing them. The process by which we 
represent our society’s will and welfare in the medium of law is an imaginative 
and expressive one, narrating the path from a virtuous past to a decent future, and 
informed by aesthetic judgment as well as instrumental reason. In so far as law 
involves the presentation of rhetoric for aesthetic judgment it is a literary practice. 
Recognizing the constitutively aesthetic basis of legal justification in the liberal 
state should induce us to revise the practice of modernist criticism of law. Much 
contemporary critical scholarship accepts the modernist premise that law should 
mirror the desires of society’s members and takes law to task for failing to do so 
with perfect accuracy. Such mimetic criticism is subject to two pathologies: 
skepticism and sentimentalism 
Skepticism is the disposition to see every practice as illegitimate unless it can 
be shown to rest on some indubitable foundation independent of the practice 
(Binder & Weisberg, 2000). Mimetic criticism becomes skeptical when it tries, 
and fails, to turn societal will into such a foundation for law. The skeptical form 
of mimetic criticism tends to begin with the proposition that political 
representation always involves an agency problem, a potential conflict between 
the interests of the represented and the interests of those who represent them. 
Accordingly, skeptical criticism deems representation legitimate only if the 
medium of representation is transparent: that is, only if it can simply copy the 
represented, without involving any discretionary choices. But as we have seen, 
political representation cannot be transparent in this sense. The teleological 
representation of welfare and the archaeological representation of consent are 
both inevitably discretionary acts of imaginative construction. 
Mimetic critics tend to treat each of the paradoxes and limitations of 
majoritarian democracy, individual liberty, and allocative efficiency separately. 
Thus, one points to the problems of social choice theory in arguing that we can 
represent society more accurately by shifting decisionmaking authority from state 
to market (Riker, 1982; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). Or, one points to the legal 
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rights problem, and the indeterminacy of allocative efficiency in arguing that we 
can represent society more accurately in shifting decisionmaking authority from 
individuals and markets to the state (Sunstein, 1986). Each argument is based on 
the fallacious premise that a more accurate, less discretionary, depiction of society 
is possible, or even desirable. The mimetic critic appears to be saying something 
constructive about which institutions should have the leading role in governing 
society, but he is merely bearing witness to the opacity inherent in any institutional 
representation of society. 
Skeptical variants of mimetic criticism recognize the opacity of both state and 
market as representative institutions, but nevertheless insist that legitimate law 
must stand on a foundation of actual consent, warranted by law’s mimetic 
resemblance to society. Skeptical criticism reasons that since law must be a 
transparent medium of representation, and legal decisionmakers necessarily have 
discretion as to how they represent society, these decisionmakers rule society 
rather than taking instruction from society (Tushnet, 1988; Levinson, 1988). One 
response to this skeptical conclusion is a flight to the formalist ideal of the rule of 
law. According to this view, law must constrain legal decisionmakers with rules, 
to prevent them from ruling oppressively. The skeptic will likely respond that 
since any such scheme of rules is subject to discretionary interpretation, no such 
scheme can prevent the oppressive exercise of discretion (Tushnet, 1988). But 
rule formalism has also provoked a second and equally pathological form of 
mimetic criticism: sentimentalist criticism. 
Sentimentality is the experience of pleasure in emotion. By sentimentalism I 
mean a sanctimonious insistence on insulating this pleasure from the threat of 
critical reflection (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). Mimetic criticism becomes 
sentimentalist when it venerates individual or group subjectivity as the occasion 
for sentimental experience, and so tries to protect it from the representative 
mediation necessary to any institutional order. Sentimental criticism of law argues 
that formal rules designed to constrain official discretion are arbitrary and 
inflexible. The result is that decision according to rule will not yield outcomes the 
represented would choose. It follows that such legal rules cannot express the true 
subjectivity of those whom law represents, and the rule of law therefore demeans 
those subject to it (Abrams, 1991; Getman, 1988; Weisberg, 1984, 1992; White, 
1990). The sentimentalist complaint is not that the rule of law oppresses, but that 
it fails to recognize, express, and empathize with the personality of the legal 
subject. The demand is not that law should construct some serviceable 
representation of the will of those subject to it, but that it should represent their 
authentic feelings and identities. 
But the demand that law represent its subject authentically misunderstands what 
political representation is. It is not an effort to copy a preexisting fact about the 
public good, but an effort to construct the public good. At an early stage in the 
development of the liberal state, Hegel offered an analysis of the problem of 
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legitimacy as a challenge to universalize recognition and civic dignity in a 
dynamically competitive economic environment. Hegel saw that recognition in a 
dynamic society had to be dialectical rather than mimetic. The state had to enable 
the citizen’s self-conscious transformation and development rather than preserve 
the conditions for a static identity. For example, to enable the individual to 
participate in the dignity of collective self-governance, the liberal state had to 
encourage cooperation by fostering the institutions of civil society (Hegel, 1942; 
Binder, 1993b). 
Both skeptical and sentimental variants of mimetic criticism set unrealistically 
high standards of accuracy and fidelity in representation. Skeptical criticism 
demands that knowledge of social will rest on indubitable epistemological 
foundations, even though pragmatism demands only that beliefs be justified by 
comparing their consequences to those of available alternatives. Sentimental 
criticism demands that representations capture the full particularity and intrinsic 
worth of each individual, even when reductive generalization may serve as a 
useful tool of practical reason. Sentimental criticism requires that law treat its 
subjects with all the tenderness and insight appropriate to an intimate 
interpersonal relationship, providing a kind of civic substitute for love. 
Yet law has the more modest ambitions of keeping the peace and organizing 
collective action. And if it is to realize these more prosaic ambitions, law will 
inevitably require institutions with arbitrary decisionmaking procedures and 
coercive power, a division of labor with attendant agency problems, and trade-
offs among competing values. In particular, representative democracy, contract, 
some sort of property, and the rule of law have all proven themselves necessary 
components of productive, peaceful, and politically responsive societies. 
Skeptical and sentimental criticisms do not offer practical alternatives to the 
institutions they criticize. This suggests that from the pragmatic standpoint, 
aesthetic standards such as social decency are more germane in evaluating law 
than mimetic standards such as representative accuracy or faithful agency (Binder, 
2001). 
Mimetic criticism is useless to normative practice because it searches 
obsessively for a foundation that cannot possibly exist. Mimetic criticism 
misconceives the nature of law’s representation of society. As we have seen, there 
is no fixed fact of the matter about individual subjectivity that law can represent 
in the process of organizing collective action. The individual preferences 
measured, aggregated, and represented by institutions such as elections and 
markets are endogenous to those institutions. Individual preferences depend on 
the social settings for the development and expression of choice. Collective 
preferences depend on the methods by which institutions identify them. The 
current freedom of individuals and collectivities to choose is at odds with their 
future freedom, and the future welfare of society depends on how we choose to 
constitute that society and measure its will. In sum, individual and societal will 
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and welfare are not facts which exist independent of law. Legal concepts such as 
public interest, contractual consent, and legislative intent are institutional 
constructs, not independent facts about society. This means that the mimetic 
conception of law’s representation of society is premised on a fallacy. Apart from 
law, society has no determinate features for law to represent. 
Because law does not – and cannot – mimic the will of society or of legal actors, 
critical scholarship about law should no longer be organized by a mimetic 
conception of law. Mimetic criticism should be replaced by aesthetic criticism, 
premised on a pragmatist model of justification and an institutionalist conception 
of law. Such aesthetic criticism presumes that law ascribes intentions and 
preferences, conditions choice, and organizes institutional settings for the 
discursive development of interests and goals. This means that law represents 
legal persons in something like the way a novel represents characters, and law 
represents legal interests and values the way a novel represents themes. 
Aesthetic criticism sees law as an arena of cultural contestation and tries to 
understand it from the standpoint of legal actors for whom it is an expressive as 
well as a strategic practice. Thus, the strategic interests legal actors pursue are 
given by identities and roles – which are shaped in part by law. In particular, the 
legal activities of disputing, transacting, and decisionmaking provide 
opportunities to claim, perform, and define identities and roles. In so doing actors 
reproduce and reshape the law and thereby affect the expressive resources 
available to themselves and others. Aesthetic criticism must recognize that our 
legal institutions, our social identities and our individual interests are mutually 
constitutive elements of culture. It is this entire culture that is the proper object of 
critique, not legal institutions taken in isolation. In helping to fashion such a 
culture, law of course influences the interests we will define and pursue. But 
perhaps more importantly, law helps determine our identities and most 
fundamental values (Binder & Weisberg, 1997). In evaluating alternative futures, 
we should be more concerned with what passions will fire our souls, than with 
how efficiently society will gratify those passions. 
To evaluate, critique, and improve law, we must give up the comforting 
assumption that there is any fact of the matter about society’s purposes for law to 
replicate. Society constructs its purposes along with its institutional organization. 
The choices society must make in thus creating itself are aesthetic choices. In a 
democratic polity, these choices must be made reflectively, as a result of a public 
discourse of aesthetic criticism. 
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